Yes, the alliteration was unintentional. As soon as I realised this blog was actually going to affect my grade for this year, I stopped the jokes. Sad, I know...
In this post I wish to place the cooperation, or lack thereof, between the Nile River riparians into context. I want to compare the NBI to other transboundary cooperation initiatives in order to assess how effective and successful it has and can be.
First we look to the Lake Chad Basin, which covers 8 countries: Algeria, , Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Central African Republic, Lybia and Cameroon. Although Asah (2015: 37) notes that equity is at the heart of 'fostering cooperation and managing conflict in transboundary water management', the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), their answer to the NBI, is arguably far from equitable in its operations. The LCBC unfairly favours Nigeria, given that Abuja provides 52% of the commissions budget, drawfing second place Cameroon , which provides 26%. It is perhaps on the data front that Nigeria are strongest. Given their technological advancement, the less developed riparians 'rely on data provided by Nigeria' (Asah 2015: 41), and thus they hold sway over the issue
Moreover, Nigeria enjoys a far greater military strength compared to the other riparians, giving it another edge over them in this already unbalanced hydropolitical situation. To top this off, Asah (2015: 41) explains that: 'The Executive Secretary of the LCBC is customarily from Nigeria, with significant implications on the conduct of hydropolitics within the basin'. If this is starting to seem a little off to you, it's because it is. Nigeria, like with Egypt and the Nile, is so socially and economically invested in the water resources of the Lake Chad Basin that it cannot afford to be equitable and share it with another 7 countries.
But I hear you asking, how is Nigeria's monopoly over the Lake Chad Basin any different from Egypt's monopoly over the Nile River? Well, for one, Nigeria does not make any chronological claims or cite any old agreements; they simply use their military and economic might to get their own way. For another, Egypt isn't monopolising and seeking to undermine the NBI using underhanded tactics, as Nigeria seem to be doing in the case of the LCBC. Whatever Egypt's thoughts about it and all its boycott and outcries, the NBI provides all its other member states with a legitimate and cooperative forum through to manage the Nile's resources. This sets it apart from the LCBC, which seems only to serve only Nigeria, despite the fact that CAR provides over 90% of the lake's water.
I'll end this post with a look at another of Africa's transboundary basins: the Niger Basin. The Niger Basin Authority (NBA) is more like the NBI than the LCBC. It is an intergovernmental body which was created in 1964, but refounded in November 1980 (Milich and Varady 1998). The NBA has 9 members: Guinea, Cote d’lvoire, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad (ibid). The organisation has been quite active and in this way is, again, more like than the NBI than the LCBC. Like the NBI, the NBA created a 'Shared Vision' in the form of an SDAP, or Sustainable Development Action Program (Andersen et al 2005). As the aforementioned authors note, the SDAP will 'create a framework for enhanced cooperation among the Basin countires' (ibid: xi) and thus facilitate transboundary dialogue and management.
So, there. In this post I've presented two case studies, one very much like the NBI and one unlike. I suppose the only difference between the NBI and NBA that seems immediately apparent to me is that no country seems to be actively dissenting to talks and cooperation, as with Egypt in the case of the NBI. In sum, this comparison has helped me see the NBI in a new light: both as similar to other transboundary water management organisations on the continent and thus as a positive contributor to a much-needed movement and paradigm in Africa; but also different to other bodies, such as the LCBC, and thus as more effective than them and a shining example to the continent.
Until next time!
List of references:
Asah, S. (2015) 'Transboundary hydro-politics and climate change rhetoric: an emerging hydro-security complex in the lake chad basin', WIREs Water, 2, 37-45.
Milich, L. and R. Varady (1998) 'Managing Transboundary Resources: Lesson from River-Basin Accords', Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 40, 8, 10-15.
Andersen, I., O. Dione, M. Jarosewich-Holder, J. Olivry and K. Golitzen (2005) The Niger River Basin: A Vision for Sustainable Management, World Bank: Washington, D.C.
Thursday 10 December 2015
Sunday 6 December 2015
One River. 437 million People. Loads of Visions: 'Realistically' assessing the Nile Basin Initiative.
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| Is it this header on the NBI's website far too optimistic? |
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| In case you've somehow forgotten, here's the Nile basin once again |
The Nile Basin Initiative was created in 1999 and sets out to provide 'riparian countries with the only all-inclusive regional platform for multi stakeholder dialogue, information sharing as well as joint planning and management of water and related resources in the Nile Basin' (NBI 2015a: n/p). It aims to achieve 'socio-economic' development in the region, as well as promote the 'equitable utilization' of the river (NBI 2015a). It has split opinion in academic circles, with some being understandably wary of it and momentarily skeptical (see, Salman 2013), yet Belay et al (2013: 15-16) lauded it as 'the most comprehensive and complex management plan ever attempted for sustainable development of international transboundary rivers'.
Following in this vein, in this blog post I'd like to be a bit more optimistic. So I'm going to hold off on the Egypt-bashing so we can celebrate some of the NBI's achievement's and look also to their ongoing projects.
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| The NBI's objectives as seen on their website (Source: NBI 2015a) |
Writing in 2003, Ruedi Kung posed that the NBI should and did approach the tense and charged situation in the Nile Basin with pragmatism and realism. He argues that to have expected the organisation to 'immediately address... the share of water each country should receive' would have been 'erroneous' (Kung 2003: 6). So what form did this pragmatic approach to 'build confidence', to use Kung's (2003: 6) phrase, take?
A current project by the name of 'Nile Cooperation for Results' (NCORE), is a two-year program which is part of the NBI's long-term 'Strategic Plan' for 2012-2016. However, it is first and foremost the first phase of five-year 'Nile Basin Climate Resilient Growth Program'. The project aims to strengthen 'the platform for cooperation and knowledge based analysis of transboundary options' regarding cooperative planning, development and management (NBI 2015b: n/p). The project also aims to divert resources towards sustainable development initiatives and focus on dam safety.
Prior to this, the Shared Vision Program (2004-2009) had succeeded in promoting an 'integrated and comprehensive approach to the management and development of the common Nile Basin water resources' (NBI 2015b: n/p). The project had cost the member states around $136 million, far more expensive than the NCORE so far, but rewarded the NBI by promoting dialogue, something which is at the core of this 16 year-old partnership (Teshome 2009).
I'll end the post here, with some of Bey et al's (2013: 16) concluding remarks, which I think put it better than I ever could:
'... [the] NBI is a paramount historical regional partnership in this new millennium as regards transboundary river basin management. This joint venture among the Nile Basin countries has created a “regional environmental-development interface think-tank” which is a vital mechanism for paving way to greater integrated water resource management that could result into mutual benefit of all without discrimination or favourism [sic]'.
Until next time!
List of references:
Daily News Egypt (2015) http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/02/22/egypt-participates-nile-basin-initiative-first-time-5-years/
Nile Basin Initiative (2015a) http://www.nilebasin.org/
Nile Basin Initiative: NBI Basin wide projects (2015b) http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php/about-us/nbi-basin-wide-projects
Belay, A., H. Semakula, G. Wambura and L. Jan (2013) 'SWOT Analysis and Challenges of Nile Basin Initiative: An Integrated Water Resource Management Perspective', Chinese Journal of Population Resources and Environment, 8, 1, 8-17.
Kung, R. (2003) 'Addressing the Dimensions of Transboundary Water Use: The Nile Basin Initiative', Mountain Research and Development, 23, 1, 4-6.
Salman, S. (2013) 'The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement: a peacefully unfolding African spring?', Water International, 38, 1, 17-29
Teshome, W. (2009) 'Transboundary Water Cooperation in Africa: The Case of the Nile Basin Initiative', Review of General Management, 2, 129-138.
Monday 23 November 2015
Recapping with the help of A. P. Demin
This week's blog will be quite brief and focus on A. P. Demin's 2015 paper in Geography and Natural Resources entitled 'Distribution of Water Resources: A Case Study of the Transboundary Nile River'. I tried getting a picture of Demin but all that Google Images gives me is images of jeans. So... moving swiftly on.
The last few posts have tried to make sense of the situation in Africa with regards to the Nile. I have put it into the wider context regarding climate change and water scarcity, spoken about some of the disputes between riparians, and last time I spoke about how we might begin to think about divvying up the river. But the thing is that Demin (2015) has done that better, so let's review his paper.
1) Demin starts by looking at the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, an agreement which he calls one of the 'most important documents' (2015: 198). The Helsinki agreement was based on the reasonable and equitable use of water resources. Some of the factors used to determine reasonable and equitable use include: 'the geography of the basin', 'the hydrology of the basin', 'the past utilization of the waters of the basin' and 'the economic and social needs of each basin State' (Demin 2015: 198). You'd think that this agreement would hold sway over the Nile debacle but it doesn't, Egypt must be using it selectively. If we were to solve the Nile problem by assessing 'the contribution of water by each basin State' (Demin 2015: 198) then we know who'd win - Sudan obviously (see Figure 1)! But Egypt makes chronological claims, citing that they've been using it for far too long to simply give up or lessen its claim.
2) The existing framework regarding Nile sharing is inadequate. After all, Demin notes the following: 'The existing international-legal regime does not constitute an effective tool for development and optimal use of the river’s water resources, because most of the region’s countries are not involved therein' (2015: 199). Below is a list of the main international agreements on the Nile River, and they make for grim reading for anyone other than Egypt (and Sudan maybe). It took 51 years, from the 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement to the 2010 Nile Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA) to bring about any form of actual cooperation in the region.
3) Demin concludes his paper by saying that 'the problem of regulation and use of the waters of the transboundary Nile river is highly multifaceted' (2015: 204). He notes that whilst international law dictates that all Nile riparians should enjoy the river equitably and reasonably, de facto practices means that this is patently not the case.
And that's how I'll end this post, on the point that the solution to the problems in the Nile isn't easy. We shouldn't trust those who say this has an easy solution - years and years of back and forth talks and negotiation tells us just the opposite. This is insanely complex, what with all the hydrology claims, chronology claims, riverine integrity claims, territorial claims, etc...
What is simple, however, and indeed quite salient, is that this is a problem which needs to a COOPERATIVE approach and solution. No longer can Egypt lead the region into a state where it is profiting at the expense of the rest of the riparian nations. To ensure this, initiatives such as the CFA need as much support as they can get.
Until next time!
Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.
List of references:
Demin, A. (2015) 'Distribution of Water Resources: A Case Study of the Transboundary Nile River', Geograhy and Natural Resources, 36, 2, 198-205.
The last few posts have tried to make sense of the situation in Africa with regards to the Nile. I have put it into the wider context regarding climate change and water scarcity, spoken about some of the disputes between riparians, and last time I spoke about how we might begin to think about divvying up the river. But the thing is that Demin (2015) has done that better, so let's review his paper.
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| This would all be much easier if we could just share the Nile like this (Source: My fantastic Paint capabilities) |
1) Demin starts by looking at the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, an agreement which he calls one of the 'most important documents' (2015: 198). The Helsinki agreement was based on the reasonable and equitable use of water resources. Some of the factors used to determine reasonable and equitable use include: 'the geography of the basin', 'the hydrology of the basin', 'the past utilization of the waters of the basin' and 'the economic and social needs of each basin State' (Demin 2015: 198). You'd think that this agreement would hold sway over the Nile debacle but it doesn't, Egypt must be using it selectively. If we were to solve the Nile problem by assessing 'the contribution of water by each basin State' (Demin 2015: 198) then we know who'd win - Sudan obviously (see Figure 1)! But Egypt makes chronological claims, citing that they've been using it for far too long to simply give up or lessen its claim.
 |
| Figure 1 (Source: unknown) |
2) The existing framework regarding Nile sharing is inadequate. After all, Demin notes the following: 'The existing international-legal regime does not constitute an effective tool for development and optimal use of the river’s water resources, because most of the region’s countries are not involved therein' (2015: 199). Below is a list of the main international agreements on the Nile River, and they make for grim reading for anyone other than Egypt (and Sudan maybe). It took 51 years, from the 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement to the 2010 Nile Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA) to bring about any form of actual cooperation in the region.
 |
| Figure 2: The main international agreements on the Nile River (Source: Demin 2015) |
3) Demin concludes his paper by saying that 'the problem of regulation and use of the waters of the transboundary Nile river is highly multifaceted' (2015: 204). He notes that whilst international law dictates that all Nile riparians should enjoy the river equitably and reasonably, de facto practices means that this is patently not the case.
And that's how I'll end this post, on the point that the solution to the problems in the Nile isn't easy. We shouldn't trust those who say this has an easy solution - years and years of back and forth talks and negotiation tells us just the opposite. This is insanely complex, what with all the hydrology claims, chronology claims, riverine integrity claims, territorial claims, etc...
What is simple, however, and indeed quite salient, is that this is a problem which needs to a COOPERATIVE approach and solution. No longer can Egypt lead the region into a state where it is profiting at the expense of the rest of the riparian nations. To ensure this, initiatives such as the CFA need as much support as they can get.
Until next time!
Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.
List of references:
Demin, A. (2015) 'Distribution of Water Resources: A Case Study of the Transboundary Nile River', Geograhy and Natural Resources, 36, 2, 198-205.
Wednesday 11 November 2015
Devising equitable allocations within the context of the Nile: grounds for despair, or reasons for hope?
Yes, I stole that title (kinda) from Arun P. Elhance (2000), but here's your citation, Mr Elhance.
As Aaron Wolf noted in 1999, the issue of 'equitable' allocations lies at 'the heart of most international water conflicts' (Wolf 1999: 3). As such, it is a problem which plagues the Nile river basin and all its riparian nations: Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt.
In this following post I wish to provide a critical reading of both papers cited above, and hopefully fit then into the context of the Nile basin. Having done so, we can see what equitable allocations may look like in this case and discuss initiatives which advocate for them.
Let us first put this issue into an appropriate context. As may have become apparent in my last post, Egypt (and Sudan too) is adamant on its position as top dog of the Nile - maintaining what Elhance (1999: 69) termed a 'colonial-era mentality' - and remains uncooperative in talks which seek to (rightfully) undermine the authority and powers of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement (see previous post for a discussion of said agreement). That's the context; while transboundary hydropolitics and hydro-diplomacy beg dialogue, Egypt almost always refuses to be part of it. As you can see, we are carrying on where we left off last week in terms of Egypt-bashing - water surprise! (I'll see myself out...)
As well as this, although as previously mentioned these water disputes have been occurring for over 50 years now, recent climate change has increasingly politically charged water in Africa. As Elhance (2000: 201) notes, water is becoming 'increasingly scarce, economically prized... and environmentally degraded', leading to what Kalron (2010) labels a ''transparent gold' rush'. Thus, given the current climate (no pun intended) on the continent, water that is transboundary in nature is especially problematic. After all, Elhance (2000: 203) rightly predicted that the 'complexity of hydroplitics multiplies as the nationally available water resources are depleted... and as the demand for water... keeps growing.'
Now that the context is out of the way, let me discuss Elhance (2000) and Wolf's (1999) papers for a while, always in the context of the Nile basin. Elhance (2000) argues first and foremost how hydropolitics is a wildly unpredictable and inherently complex. He notes that riparians must all be willing to negotiate, and his paper relies on this assumption (or maybe hope is the better word). However, we know this to not be the case with the Nile Basin. Although there have yet been no direct armed conflicts between countries in the basin, this is not tantamount to peace in the area (Mekonnen 2011), let alone cooperation. Egypt, and Sudan for that matter, are not famous for their willingness to negotiate, as was demonstrated with their contempt regarding the 2010 Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA). Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda all signed the agreement at a meeting in Entebbe, Uganda (BBC News 2010), yet Egypt and Sudan voiced opposition to it despite the fact that they were members of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).
So now that we know Egypt isn't up for talking (unless it directly benefits them, see last post), what does Wolf (1999) propose?
Well, to be honest this is even more bleak. As if the 1997 UN Convention wasn't complex enough, existing agreements in the Nile context through up even more problems. Essentially, while upstream countries want to battle the power of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement, Egypt holds fast to it, arguing that it cannot lose a single drop of its allowance given its heavy reliance on the river.
The Convention doesn't help in this respect, or in the case of devising equitable allocations between riparian, or 'watecourse' as the Convention terms them, states. Articles 5 and 7 seem to be in direct conflict, with the former advocating 'equitable' and 'reasonable' use of water resources, and the latter dictating that any form of use is fine so long as 'appropriate measures' are in place to 'prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States' (UN Convention 1997). So while one is for a equity and sustainability approach, the other is for a free-for-all scenario which also (I'm sure reluctantly) bears in mind other countries' interests. Given this, the Convention is 'somewhat vague and even contradictory' in terms of its guidelines on equitable allocations (Wolf 1999: 14).
So that's how this week's blog comes to an end, on a bleak note, as is becoming my habit it seems. But this is very much a contemporary and current issue. Although as of yet the only guidelines pertaining to allocations of the Nile exist in 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement (NTV Kenya 2010),
guidelines which give the lion's share to Egypt, ongoing initiatives seek to repudiate this agreement and move towards a future in which the world's longest river serves all 11 riparians equally and sustainably. So for the time being, this post on the state of Nile hydropolitics gives both grounds for despair and reasons for hope. You weren't expected that double whammy were you?
Until next time!
Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.
List of references:
NTV Kenya (2010) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ge6tVv2ZKQI#t=71
Kalron, N. (2010) 'A 'transparent gold' rush?', African Security Review, 19, 3, 110-113.
Elhance, A. (1999) Hydropolitics of the Third World: Conflict and Cooperaiton in International River Basins, Washington, D.C: United States Institure of Peace Press.
Elhance, A. (2000) 'Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope', International Negotiation, 5, 201-222.
Wolf, A. (1999) 'Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict', Natural Resources Forum, 23, 3-30.
Mekonnen, D. (2011) 'Between the Scylla of Water Security and Charybdis of Benefit Sharing: The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement – Failed or Just Teetering on the Brink?', Goettingen Journal of International Law, 3, 1, 345-372.
BBC News (2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8682387.stm
News Ghana (2015) http://newsghana.com.gh/egypts-president-addresses-ethiopias-parliament
As Aaron Wolf noted in 1999, the issue of 'equitable' allocations lies at 'the heart of most international water conflicts' (Wolf 1999: 3). As such, it is a problem which plagues the Nile river basin and all its riparian nations: Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt.
 |
| Egypt's seat at the signing of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework sits empty, a symbol of their lack of interest in talks over the equitable sharing of the Nile (Source: NTV Kenya 2010). |
Let us first put this issue into an appropriate context. As may have become apparent in my last post, Egypt (and Sudan too) is adamant on its position as top dog of the Nile - maintaining what Elhance (1999: 69) termed a 'colonial-era mentality' - and remains uncooperative in talks which seek to (rightfully) undermine the authority and powers of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement (see previous post for a discussion of said agreement). That's the context; while transboundary hydropolitics and hydro-diplomacy beg dialogue, Egypt almost always refuses to be part of it. As you can see, we are carrying on where we left off last week in terms of Egypt-bashing - water surprise! (I'll see myself out...)
As well as this, although as previously mentioned these water disputes have been occurring for over 50 years now, recent climate change has increasingly politically charged water in Africa. As Elhance (2000: 201) notes, water is becoming 'increasingly scarce, economically prized... and environmentally degraded', leading to what Kalron (2010) labels a ''transparent gold' rush'. Thus, given the current climate (no pun intended) on the continent, water that is transboundary in nature is especially problematic. After all, Elhance (2000: 203) rightly predicted that the 'complexity of hydroplitics multiplies as the nationally available water resources are depleted... and as the demand for water... keeps growing.'
Now that the context is out of the way, let me discuss Elhance (2000) and Wolf's (1999) papers for a while, always in the context of the Nile basin. Elhance (2000) argues first and foremost how hydropolitics is a wildly unpredictable and inherently complex. He notes that riparians must all be willing to negotiate, and his paper relies on this assumption (or maybe hope is the better word). However, we know this to not be the case with the Nile Basin. Although there have yet been no direct armed conflicts between countries in the basin, this is not tantamount to peace in the area (Mekonnen 2011), let alone cooperation. Egypt, and Sudan for that matter, are not famous for their willingness to negotiate, as was demonstrated with their contempt regarding the 2010 Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA). Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda all signed the agreement at a meeting in Entebbe, Uganda (BBC News 2010), yet Egypt and Sudan voiced opposition to it despite the fact that they were members of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).
So now that we know Egypt isn't up for talking (unless it directly benefits them, see last post), what does Wolf (1999) propose?
 |
| Sisi doing his best to look happy about finally agreeing with Ethiopia on something (Source: News Ghana 2015) |
The Convention doesn't help in this respect, or in the case of devising equitable allocations between riparian, or 'watecourse' as the Convention terms them, states. Articles 5 and 7 seem to be in direct conflict, with the former advocating 'equitable' and 'reasonable' use of water resources, and the latter dictating that any form of use is fine so long as 'appropriate measures' are in place to 'prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States' (UN Convention 1997). So while one is for a equity and sustainability approach, the other is for a free-for-all scenario which also (I'm sure reluctantly) bears in mind other countries' interests. Given this, the Convention is 'somewhat vague and even contradictory' in terms of its guidelines on equitable allocations (Wolf 1999: 14).
So that's how this week's blog comes to an end, on a bleak note, as is becoming my habit it seems. But this is very much a contemporary and current issue. Although as of yet the only guidelines pertaining to allocations of the Nile exist in 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement (NTV Kenya 2010),
 |
| CFA signatories look extremely happy given they've just stuck it to Egypt and Sudan (Source: NTV Kenya 2010) |
guidelines which give the lion's share to Egypt, ongoing initiatives seek to repudiate this agreement and move towards a future in which the world's longest river serves all 11 riparians equally and sustainably. So for the time being, this post on the state of Nile hydropolitics gives both grounds for despair and reasons for hope. You weren't expected that double whammy were you?
Until next time!
Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.
List of references:
NTV Kenya (2010) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ge6tVv2ZKQI#t=71
Kalron, N. (2010) 'A 'transparent gold' rush?', African Security Review, 19, 3, 110-113.
Elhance, A. (1999) Hydropolitics of the Third World: Conflict and Cooperaiton in International River Basins, Washington, D.C: United States Institure of Peace Press.
Elhance, A. (2000) 'Hydropolitics: Grounds for Despair, Reasons for Hope', International Negotiation, 5, 201-222.
Wolf, A. (1999) 'Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict', Natural Resources Forum, 23, 3-30.
Mekonnen, D. (2011) 'Between the Scylla of Water Security and Charybdis of Benefit Sharing: The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement – Failed or Just Teetering on the Brink?', Goettingen Journal of International Law, 3, 1, 345-372.
BBC News (2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8682387.stm
News Ghana (2015) http://newsghana.com.gh/egypts-president-addresses-ethiopias-parliament
Tuesday 3 November 2015
The Grand Rennaisance Dam and hydropolitical tensions over the Nile
So here is the blog post in which I finally narrow down, or at least attempt to. Richard told us to go 'narrow and deep' rather than 'wide and shallow', so here goes:
The Nile River: One river. 11 countries. 4,132 miles. 300 million people. A ton of disputes. That's the deal with the Nile in a nutshell. Its basin spans 3.4 million square kilometers, from Egypt in the north to Tanzania in the south, sparking conflicts every step of the way (see Figure 1) (Encyclopedia Britannica 2015).
As it is the recurring leitmotif of the Nile's history, this tendency for conflict and dispute is a worthy candidate for academic work. Historians, geographers, policy makers, and political scientists have all flocked to study and analyse, as well as suggest possible solutions (Dinar 2012). But don't worry, they ain't got nothing on me.
First we must look at why the Nile is a source of conflict and even potential war (as Egypt's former President Mohammed Morsi suggested) (Rahman 2012). Why can't a resource be shared between 11 countries? What's the big deal? Well to put it simply, Egypt has monopolised the Nile since... since... basically forever. And this has caused some tension - and 'tension' is a massive understatement when this life-sustaining liquid is concerned. Some Greek bloke called Herodotus told them that Egypt was the 'gift of the Nile' and they took that WAY too seriously (Kendie 1999). Today, over 80% of the water Egypt uses annually comes from the Blue Nile (Kendie 1999). The irony here is that Blue Nile originates in Lake Tana, Ethiopia. Therein lies the conflict.
Ethiopia is not alone, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya have all voiced complaints about Egypt's domination of the river's resources. Born out of this was the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), a 'joint program of action whose aim is to ensure cooperation and economic integration, sustainable resource development and security', created in 1999 (Teshome 2009: 130). Prior to this, international brokers such as the World Bank had taken charge of ensuring dialogue between the riparian nations (ibid). Prior to that, a 1929 agreement existed between Sudan and Egypt (who, back then, were ruled as one country), giving the lion's share of the Nile's water to said countries (Kung 2003; African Research Bulletin 2010). It was actually this old agreement (which was revised in 1959) that led to the formation of the NBI; upstream countries were discontent with the share of the water they were receiving and the fact that they had to ask Egypt for permission to construct dams or other structures that could alter river flow. Usually the upstream countries are those who hold the power, like Turkey with the Tigris river, but British colonial rule meant that Egypt had total control of the river (New York Times 2010). In the Nile scenario, the upstream countries label this agreement an 'unfair vestige of colonialism' (ibid: n/p). And right they are.
The NBI sought to contest the 1929 agreement, and it has four main objectives:
1) To develop the Nile River water resources in a equitable and sustainable manner in order to ensure prosperity, security and peace for the inhabitants.
2) To guarantee effective water management and optimal resources use.
3) To promote cooperation and combined action between member countries.
4) To combat poverty and promote economic integration (Sileet et al 2007, cited in Teshome, 2010: 131).
The most significant contribution made by the NBI was the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which by March 2015 had been signed by six countries and ratified by three (NBI 2015). The CFA hopes to establish 'principles, rights and obligations to ensure long-term and sustainable management and development of the shared Nile waters' (NBI 2015: n/p), and is backed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania among others. As expected, Egypt completely rejects the CFA, clinging on to the belief that it has some sort of God-given right to the Nile, continuously touting the 1929 as proof.
However, whatever progress was arguably made could be said to have been all in vain due to the polemical debate surrounding Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam (Figure 2). Ethiopia's plans to construct the dam greatly angered Egypt, with some officials even heard on TV discussing bombing the structure if it were to be built (Bahrenegash 2013). Although it is still in the process of being built, the dam will be Africa's largest hydroelectric power plant and largest dam, standing at 170 metres and being able to hold 70 billion cubic meters of water (CCTV Africa 2014). Ethiopia hope that it will greatly boost the country's energy security, with the dam being able to generate 6,000 megawatts (ibid). While Egypt claimed that the dam would decrease the amount of water that reached its borders, Ethiopia argued that its construction was vital to the country's development, and that in fact the dam may even improve water flow to Egypt by reducing evaporation at Lake Nasser (Al Jazeera 2014)
Despite this, in 2014 the Egyptian government demanded that the project be halted - Ethiopia, understandably, politely declined (Al Jazeera 2014; Bloomberg 2014). Cue back and forth talks, delegates moving to and fro, and the desperate use of diplomacy as both countries held that they preferred that over conflict. And... voila! Earlier this very year, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt signed a deal 'designed to ease fears that a controversial new dam could spark a regional conflict' (Euro News 2015: n/p). The deal even gives Egypt preferential treatment when the dam's HEP capabilities become fully functional, and it doesn't seem like Egypt has made any concessions with regards to the water it demands a right to. It seems this agreement merely abated Sisi, momentarily appeasing him.
Although this seems resolved, this is perhaps only temporary. The dam is just over halfway complete and could spark further conflict in the future before it is completed in 2017, and maybe even after! I say this because the words of President Sisi on the occasion of the signing of the agreement seem oddly threatening: 'You [Ethiopia] will develop and grow and I am with you, but be aware that in Egypt the people live only on the water that comes from this river...' (Euro News 2015).
I may not be likely to give Egypt the benefit of the doubt after having spent hours reading about how greedy and downright arrogant they can be when it comes to hydro-diplomacy, but that sure does sound like a veiled threat to me.
Until next time!
Check this video out if the Grand Renaissance dam interests you. I really doubt a dam will interest you enough to watch a YouTube video that's 29 minutes long but, hey, at least I tried!
Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.
List of references:
Encyclopedia Brittanica (2015) http://www.britannica.com/place/Nile-River
Rough Guides (2013) http://www.roughguides.com/article/great-rivers-of-the-world-the-nile/
Kendie, D. (1999) 'Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of Blue Nile River', Northeast African Studies, 6, 141-169.
Dinar, S. (2012) 'The Geographical Dimensions of Hydro-politics: International Freshwater in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia', Eurasian Geography and Economics, 53, 1, 115-142.
Teshome, W. (2009) 'Transboundary Water Cooperation in Africa: The Case of the Nile Basin Initiative', Review of General Management, 2, 129-138.
Africa Research Bulletin (2010) 'Nile Basin Initiative: Contentious Issue', Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series, 47, 6, 18724-18725.
Kung, R. (2003) 'Addressing the Dimensions of Transboundary Water Use: The Nile Basin Initiative', Mountain Research and Development, 23, 1, 4-6.
New York Times (2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26nile.html?_r=2&ref=world
Rahman, M. (2012) 'Water Security: Ethiopia–Egypt Transboundary Challenges over the Nile River Basin', Journal of Asian and African Studies, 48, 1, 35-46.
Nile Basin Initiative (2015) http://nilebasin.org/index.php/about-us/the-nb-cooperative-framework
Bahrenegash (2013) http://bahrenegash.com/?p=news&ref=495
CCTV Africa (2014) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RD72UStS-yI
Al Jazeera (2014) http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/egypt-disputes-ethiopiarenaissancedam.html
Bloomberg (2014) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-08/ethiopia-rejects-egyptian-proposal-on-nile-as-dam-talks-falter
Euro News (2015) http://www.euronews.com/2015/03/23/egypt-ethiopia-and-sudan-sign-deal-on-nile-dam-
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| This picture is crying out for a '#takemeback #tb' post on Instagram (Source: Rough Guides 2015) |
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| Figure 1: The Nile River Basin in all its glory (Source: Rough Guides 2013) |
First we must look at why the Nile is a source of conflict and even potential war (as Egypt's former President Mohammed Morsi suggested) (Rahman 2012). Why can't a resource be shared between 11 countries? What's the big deal? Well to put it simply, Egypt has monopolised the Nile since... since... basically forever. And this has caused some tension - and 'tension' is a massive understatement when this life-sustaining liquid is concerned. Some Greek bloke called Herodotus told them that Egypt was the 'gift of the Nile' and they took that WAY too seriously (Kendie 1999). Today, over 80% of the water Egypt uses annually comes from the Blue Nile (Kendie 1999). The irony here is that Blue Nile originates in Lake Tana, Ethiopia. Therein lies the conflict.
Ethiopia is not alone, Uganda, Sudan and Kenya have all voiced complaints about Egypt's domination of the river's resources. Born out of this was the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), a 'joint program of action whose aim is to ensure cooperation and economic integration, sustainable resource development and security', created in 1999 (Teshome 2009: 130). Prior to this, international brokers such as the World Bank had taken charge of ensuring dialogue between the riparian nations (ibid). Prior to that, a 1929 agreement existed between Sudan and Egypt (who, back then, were ruled as one country), giving the lion's share of the Nile's water to said countries (Kung 2003; African Research Bulletin 2010). It was actually this old agreement (which was revised in 1959) that led to the formation of the NBI; upstream countries were discontent with the share of the water they were receiving and the fact that they had to ask Egypt for permission to construct dams or other structures that could alter river flow. Usually the upstream countries are those who hold the power, like Turkey with the Tigris river, but British colonial rule meant that Egypt had total control of the river (New York Times 2010). In the Nile scenario, the upstream countries label this agreement an 'unfair vestige of colonialism' (ibid: n/p). And right they are.
The NBI sought to contest the 1929 agreement, and it has four main objectives:
1) To develop the Nile River water resources in a equitable and sustainable manner in order to ensure prosperity, security and peace for the inhabitants.
2) To guarantee effective water management and optimal resources use.
3) To promote cooperation and combined action between member countries.
4) To combat poverty and promote economic integration (Sileet et al 2007, cited in Teshome, 2010: 131).
The most significant contribution made by the NBI was the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which by March 2015 had been signed by six countries and ratified by three (NBI 2015). The CFA hopes to establish 'principles, rights and obligations to ensure long-term and sustainable management and development of the shared Nile waters' (NBI 2015: n/p), and is backed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania among others. As expected, Egypt completely rejects the CFA, clinging on to the belief that it has some sort of God-given right to the Nile, continuously touting the 1929 as proof.
However, whatever progress was arguably made could be said to have been all in vain due to the polemical debate surrounding Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance Dam (Figure 2). Ethiopia's plans to construct the dam greatly angered Egypt, with some officials even heard on TV discussing bombing the structure if it were to be built (Bahrenegash 2013). Although it is still in the process of being built, the dam will be Africa's largest hydroelectric power plant and largest dam, standing at 170 metres and being able to hold 70 billion cubic meters of water (CCTV Africa 2014). Ethiopia hope that it will greatly boost the country's energy security, with the dam being able to generate 6,000 megawatts (ibid). While Egypt claimed that the dam would decrease the amount of water that reached its borders, Ethiopia argued that its construction was vital to the country's development, and that in fact the dam may even improve water flow to Egypt by reducing evaporation at Lake Nasser (Al Jazeera 2014)
 |
| Figure 2: The location of the dam (Source: BBC News 2015) |
Although this seems resolved, this is perhaps only temporary. The dam is just over halfway complete and could spark further conflict in the future before it is completed in 2017, and maybe even after! I say this because the words of President Sisi on the occasion of the signing of the agreement seem oddly threatening: 'You [Ethiopia] will develop and grow and I am with you, but be aware that in Egypt the people live only on the water that comes from this river...' (Euro News 2015).
I may not be likely to give Egypt the benefit of the doubt after having spent hours reading about how greedy and downright arrogant they can be when it comes to hydro-diplomacy, but that sure does sound like a veiled threat to me.
Until next time!
Check this video out if the Grand Renaissance dam interests you. I really doubt a dam will interest you enough to watch a YouTube video that's 29 minutes long but, hey, at least I tried!
Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may soon become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.
List of references:
Encyclopedia Brittanica (2015) http://www.britannica.com/place/Nile-River
Rough Guides (2013) http://www.roughguides.com/article/great-rivers-of-the-world-the-nile/
Kendie, D. (1999) 'Egypt and the Hydro-Politics of Blue Nile River', Northeast African Studies, 6, 141-169.
Dinar, S. (2012) 'The Geographical Dimensions of Hydro-politics: International Freshwater in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia', Eurasian Geography and Economics, 53, 1, 115-142.
Teshome, W. (2009) 'Transboundary Water Cooperation in Africa: The Case of the Nile Basin Initiative', Review of General Management, 2, 129-138.
Africa Research Bulletin (2010) 'Nile Basin Initiative: Contentious Issue', Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series, 47, 6, 18724-18725.
Kung, R. (2003) 'Addressing the Dimensions of Transboundary Water Use: The Nile Basin Initiative', Mountain Research and Development, 23, 1, 4-6.
New York Times (2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/world/middleeast/26nile.html?_r=2&ref=world
Rahman, M. (2012) 'Water Security: Ethiopia–Egypt Transboundary Challenges over the Nile River Basin', Journal of Asian and African Studies, 48, 1, 35-46.
Nile Basin Initiative (2015) http://nilebasin.org/index.php/about-us/the-nb-cooperative-framework
Bahrenegash (2013) http://bahrenegash.com/?p=news&ref=495
CCTV Africa (2014) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RD72UStS-yI
Al Jazeera (2014) http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/egypt-disputes-ethiopiarenaissancedam.html
Bloomberg (2014) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-08/ethiopia-rejects-egyptian-proposal-on-nile-as-dam-talks-falter
Euro News (2015) http://www.euronews.com/2015/03/23/egypt-ethiopia-and-sudan-sign-deal-on-nile-dam-
Friday 23 October 2015
A more focused look at African hydropolitics: surface water disputes and much-needed context.
After reading my first blog post again, I feel it is now the time to focus in a bit more. In my introduction, I spoke about both groundwater and surface water and waxed lyrical about how I was going to discuss both. I now realise that was unrealistic of me. And counter-productive too. In fact, you'll find that I'll revising a lot of my so-called 'aims' that I set out in my first blog post. Forgive me, I was a bit too excited - hydropolitics will do that to you.
Now, surface water. Although groundwater remains a fascinating area of focus, for the sake of producing a more in-depth blog, I've instead chosen to explore surface water hydropolitics. And, as Figure 1 shows you, Africa is not lacking in transboundary basins, all which are rife with potential conflicts, negotiations and all the problems associated with sharing any resource; be it water, oil, or the last slice of cake at home - you're not going to give up your claim for that stuff too easily I'd imagine (If you thought that was a bad joke, wait till I get to my water related puns in future posts, they'll really make you press Alt + F4 quicker than you've ever done before).
I'm still, however, deciding which water source I will focus on in this blog; I have it narrowed down to three, with each being used by three or more countries.
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| Figure 1: A table displaying all 11 international river basins in Africa (Source: Goulden et al 2009). |
Putting it all into context:
I must begin first with placing the issue of surface water hydropolitics in context. As I mentioned in my first post, transboundary water disputes are not exclusive to the continent of Africa; however, there they are especially pronounced and problematic given the current situation. Africa is world's most water scarce continent (see Figure 2). Be it physical or economic, it is the reason why Sub-Saharan Africa has the most water-stressed countries in any region on earth (UN-Water/FAO: 20). Were this not already severe enough, climate change is set to make it an even bigger challenge (Zinyowera et al 1997; Desanker at al 2001). Temperatures on the continent will rise higher than any other place on earth (de Wit and Stankiewicz 2006), subsequently exacerbating rainfall shortages and causing evapotranspiration to reach hitherto un-recorded levels. Droughts will be more frequent and harsh, and so will floods; Africa may bear the biggest brunt of climate change unless 'urgent' work is done in time to quickly counter-act or mitigate it (Nyong 2005).
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| Figure 2: A global map of water scarcity (Source: WWAP 2012). |
It is indeed quite overwhelming to imagine that Africa is plagued by threats to its water security on two quite distinct and problematic fronts. What is more overwhelming, and frankly saddening, is what Figure 3 shows us: Africa may be the second most populous continent on earth (Niang et al 2014), but it is hardly at all responsible for the on-set of anthropogenically-induced climate change, a phenomenon which unfortunately will dictate the fate of its water resources for the foreseeable future. And no, don't point out South Africa (which ranks a lowly 22nd out of 24) to try pick apart that statement - that is one country out of 54.
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| Figure 3: CO2 emissions from 1990-2013 (Source: EDGAR 2014) |
In this context, the study of hydropolitics is especially important. Facing both the perils of climate change and the rising demands of a growing population, water sources which are transboundary in nature will become increasingly sources of contention as nations battle to secure their claim. It is no wonder, therefore, that the UN included 'Transboundary Cooperation' as one of eight factors which determine water security, citing that 'achieving water security requires collaboration across... political borders to reduce the risk of potential conflicts...' (UN-Water 2013).
Although what I've just gone into detail about above may seem all doom and gloom, I hope that my discussion of the potential success of sharing water resources will brighten up this blog. While it is incontrovertible that many African countries suffer from water scarcity, most only require adequate management to cope with the stresses climate change and population growth will place on them.
That sounds like a massive over-simplication. It is, kind of. But let's roll with it (Sorry, Richard).
Hydropolitics is defined as 'the systematic study of conflict and cooperate over international water resources' (Elhance 1997). The term was coined by John Waterbury (you can't make this stuff up, really) in his 1979 book Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley, and generally refers to the politics surrounding transboundary water resources. Nevertheless, hydropolitics do exist intranationally, and I may even discuss that during the course of this blog.
Water conflicts, Taylor (2004) writes, are more often than not based on a simple tension, that which exists between territorial sovereignty and riverine integrity. Countries which make territorial claims argue that they have 'absolute rights over water flowing through its territory'; those claiming riverine integrity pose that 'every riparian is entitled to the natural flow of a river system crossing its border' (Taylor: 214). This plays out in a contemporary setting due to conflicts over the Nile Basin. While Egypt (downstream) lays a claim to the Nile's resources, so too does Ethiopia (upstream). Here we observe a clear conflict, given that if Ethiopia were to be irresponsible in its abstraction of the river's water, this would directly impact Egypt's water availability.
Water conflicts, Taylor (2004) writes, are more often than not based on a simple tension, that which exists between territorial sovereignty and riverine integrity. Countries which make territorial claims argue that they have 'absolute rights over water flowing through its territory'; those claiming riverine integrity pose that 'every riparian is entitled to the natural flow of a river system crossing its border' (Taylor: 214). This plays out in a contemporary setting due to conflicts over the Nile Basin. While Egypt (downstream) lays a claim to the Nile's resources, so too does Ethiopia (upstream). Here we observe a clear conflict, given that if Ethiopia were to be irresponsible in its abstraction of the river's water, this would directly impact Egypt's water availability.
There are several actors at play in these kinds of conflicts, from politicians, to international bodies such as the UN, right down to small-scale farmers who depend on the water that is at the heart of said conflicts. This is an issue which plagues Africa most of all, given the sheer amount of international river basins, but also the situation in which it finds itself at the start of the 21st century.
So now I've left you thinking, 'Water they gonna do about it then?' (wow, they're here earlier than I planned). Well the answer is this: International cooperation when dealing with transboundary water resources is a must. If water disputes are to be solved and if equity is to be achieved, conversations must take place and agreements must occur.
In my next blog I'll hopefully be discussing one or two papers which explore the dynamics and issues surrounding transboundary water management in my chosen basin.
Here is an interesting interview with Benjamin Pohl, the lead author of 'The Rise of Hydro-Diplomacy', a report which calls for 'more engagement of the international community in order to support conflict prevention and regional inegration in transboundary waters'.
Kofi Annan once warned the world that competition over fresh water may become a source of war in the future. An African continent without legitimate and effective transboundary water agreements may be the battleground for such a war sooner rather than later.
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List of references:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carter, R. and A. Parker (2009) 'Climate change, population trends and groundwater in Africa', Hydrological Sciences, 54, 4, 676-689.
Desanker et al (2001) 'IPCC assessment', cited in Niang et al (2014).
de Wit, M. and J. Stankiewicz (2006) 'Changes in surface Water Supply Across Africa with Predicted Climate Change', Science, 311, 1917-1921.
EDGAR (2014) 'Trends in Global CO2 Emissions', http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/news_docs/jrc-2014-trends-in-global-co2-emissions-2014-report-93171.pdf
Elhance, A. (1997) 'Conflict and cooperation over water in the Aral Sea basin', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20, 2, 207-218.
Goulden, M., D. Conway and A. Persechino (2009) 'Adapting to climate change in international river basins in Afroca: a review', Hydrological Sciences, 54, 5, 805-828.
Niang et al (2014) 'Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability', Chapter 22, https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=i7QNCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1199&lpg=PA1199&dq=:+Climate+Change+2014:+Impacts,+Adaptation,+and+Vulnerability.+Niang&source=bl&ots=-WwbQYFUAo&sig=LD3Iq8FWG_q1mZxq46bPnhj9PxM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CEQQ6AEwBWoVChMIw5eplMrZyAIVTFsaCh1GhQG4#v=onepage&q=%3A%20Climate%20Change%202014%3A%20Impacts%2C%20Adaptation%2C%20and%20Vulnerability.%20Niang&f=false
Nyong, A. (2005) 'Impacts of climate change in the tropics: the African experience', Keynote presentation, Met Office, February 2005.
Taylor, R. (2004) 'Water resources and development challenges in eastern and southern Africa', in T. Bowyer-Bower and D. Potts (eds) East and Southern Africa: Regional Development, London: Addison-Wesley Longman, 198-228.
UN-Water/FAO (2007) 'Coping with water scarcity: Challenge of the 21st century', http://www.fao.org/nr/water/docs/escarcity.pdf
UN-Water (2013) 'UN Water Analytical Brief on Water Security and the Global Water Agenda', http://www.unwater.org/fileadmin/user_upload/unwater_new/docs/water_security_poster_Oct2013.pdf
Vörösmarty, C., J. Green, P. Salisbury and R. Lammers (2000) 'Global water resources: vulnerability from climate change and population growth', Science, 289, 284-288.
Waterbury, J. (1979) Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
World Water Assessment Programme (2012) 'Managing Water Under Uncertainty and Risk', http://www.zaragoza.es/ciudad/medioambiente/onu/en/detallePer_Onu?id=71
Zinyowera et al (1997) 'IPCC assessment', cited in Niang et al (2014).
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